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Fourteen years ago, Robert Gordon noted that scholars associated
with the Critical Legal Studies movement "pay a lot of attention to
history."' In fact, wrote Gordon, Critical Legal Studies scholars "have
probably devoted more pages to historical description-particularly
the intellectual history of legal doctrine-than to anything else.",
2
Much the same could be said today of the academic movement known
as Critical Race Theory. Although Critical Race theorists are
concerned above all with alleviating current racial injustice, they
devote a good deal of their intellectual energy to examining the past.
In the following Book Note, I consider one of the most recent and
celebrated historical contributions to Critical Race Theory, Ian Haney
L6pez's White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race.3 Unlike other
evaluations of White by Law,4 this Book Note focuses not on Haney
L6pez's theoretical objectives, but on one of his central empirical
claims. In particular, it examines Haney L6pez's pathbreaking
discussion of the role anthropological evidence played in determining
the outcome of two Supreme Court decisions of the 1920s: Ozawa v.
United States5 and United States v. Thind.6 Both decisions clarified
the racial requirements for becoming a naturalized U.S. citizen under
federal law.
I have divided this Book Note into three brief sections. First, I
describe the subject of White by Law and explain why Haney L6pez's
1. Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 57 (1984).
2. Id.
3. IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996).
4. For full-length reviews, see Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Restrictions on Naturalization: The
Recurring Intersection of Race and Gender in Immigration and Citizenship Law, 11 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 142 (1996); and Frank H. Wu, From Black to White and Back Again, 3 ASIAN L.J.
185 (1996).
5. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922).
6. United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923).
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analysis of Ozawa and Thind forms the foundation on which he
constructs his more general historical and normative conclusions.
Second, by considering the language of Ozawa and Thind and the
jurisprudence of Justice George Sutherland, the author of both
decisions, I suggest how that analysis is open to empirical critique. My
remarks on Justice Sutherland focus on his consistent wariness toward
the use of social science by the Supreme Court, as well as on his drive
to consolidate federal authority over international affairs. Finally, I
propose an alternative perspective on Ozawa and Thind that I hope
might supplement Haney L6pez's trenchant interpretation.
I
The historical subject of White by Law is straightforward. Strictly
limiting the empirical bounds of his inquiry, Haney L6pez examines
a series of thirty-seven state and federal court decisions handed down
between 1878 and 1923, decisions he usefully terms "the racial
prerequisite cases. ',7 These now-infamous rulings interpreted an
ambiguous statutory requirement for becoming a naturalized U.S.
citizen enacted by Congress in 1790: that applicants for citizenship be
"white persons."' Significantly, in the more than 150 years this
statutory provision remained in effect, Congress never explicitly
identified whom the term "white" was meant to include. Lawmakers
seem to have thought the word was clear on its face.9 While this lack
of definition posed little problem throughout most of the nineteenth
century, it became the source of legal dispute in the 1870s, when non-
European settlement in the United States began to expand. Beginning
at that time and continuing until the passage of the McCarran-Walter
Act in 1952,10 members of diverse national groups who had been
denied citizenship on the grounds that they were not "white" brought
suit claiming that they had been misclassified. In the absence of
express definition from Washington, it was left to courts to determine
just how the word "white" was to be understood. The resulting
decisions, the "prerequisite cases" of Haney L6pez's analysis, among
them Ozawa and Thind, were historically important on several levels.
Most immediately, by clarifying the ambiguous term "white," the
7. HANEY LOPEZ, supra note 3, at 3. Although there were a total of 52 prerequisite cases,
Haney L6pez examines only those decided prior to Thind. For a list of racial prerequisite cases,
see id. at 203-08.
8. Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103. This was amended by the Act of July 14, 1870,
ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256 (allowing "aliens of African nativity and.., persons of African
descent" to apply for naturalized citizenship as well).
9. Indeed, the racial restriction generally appears not to have been the subject of debate. For
possible reasons, see ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP
IN U.S. HISTORY 159-60 (1997).
10. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 2, § 311, 66 Stat. 239.
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decisions explicitly drew the boundaries of American national identity
according to a vision of racial exclusion; they thus represented an
especially powerful manifestation of the stratified conception of
citizenship that has haunted the United States since its founding."
The cases also sounded in the history of immigration and real
property: In 1924, Congress restricted immigration solely to those
persons capable of naturalization (that is, to "white persons"), and, at
about the same time, western states passed a series of laws similarly
limiting title to land.
12
Haney L6pez brings a variety of theoretical perspectives to bear on
his analysis of the prerequisite cases; for the purposes of this Book
Note, however, the most significant is Barbara Flagg's recent
argument that white racial identity is characterized by "transparency,"
or what she calls "the transparency phenomenon.,' 13 According to
Flagg, one of the defining characteristics of European Americans as
a group is their general failure to acknowledge their own "norms,
behavior, experiences, or perspectives" as "white-specific."' 4 Whites
tend to think of "race" as a quality that inheres exclusively in others,
not in themselves. This lack of critical awareness, argues Flagg,
perpetuates racial inequality by obscuring the function of racial
privilege in social and economic life. Among its many other
achievements, White by Law expands this thought-provoking analysis
by tracing the origin of transparency into the very heart of the legal
system. According to Haney L6pez, the law plays an important, if not
central, role in forging racial identity. "On multiple levels," he writes,
"law is implicated in the construction of the contingent social systems
of meaning that attach in our society to morphology and ancestry."' 5
Law, that is, literally "constructs race.' '16 Haney L6pez uses the
prerequisite cases to develop and add historical specificity to Flagg's
analytic framework. For if law constructs race, and if white identity is
defined largely by transparency, then the prerequisite decisions, which
directly address the question of what constitutes a white person and
so "exemplify the construction of Whiteness,"' 7 should exhibit how
11. On racial hierarchy in the history of American citizenship, see generally SMITH, supra
note 9.
12. See Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 13(c), 43 Stat. 153, 162. For an early introduction
to anti-alien land legislation, see MILTON R. KoNvITz, THE ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC IN
AMERICAN LAW 148-70 (1946).
13. BARBARA J. FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT Now I SEE: WHITE RACE CONSCIOUSNESS AND
THE LAW 1 (1998).
14. Barbara Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Re-
quirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 957 (1993).
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transparency originates at the level of the legal process. Here, Haney
L6pez employs a key critical concept from cultural studies: that of
"naturalization," the process by which "socially constructed"
categories appear to assume objective existence in the material world.
For Haney L6pez, the prerequisite cases helped maintain white
transparency and social dominance by masking the contingency of
racial classifications and so "naturalizing" racial difference itself.
Within the history of the prerequisite cases, Ozawa and Thind hold
an especially important place and consequently play a pivotal role in
Haney L6pez's analysis. The judges considering the prerequisite cases
faced a difficult semantic dilemma: In the absence of clear language
from Congress, how could they decide whether or not a particular
applicant for citizenship was "white" under federal law? On what
basis were they to make such a decision? There were a variety of
rationales available (including an examination of original congres-
sional intent or, when appropriate, the use of judicial precedent), but
two became especially prominent. The first was what might be called
a "scientific standard." According to this rationale, judges were to
determine who was white by employing the racial classification
schemes developed within the science of anthropology. This rule
typically was based on the assertion that "white" was synonymous
with the word "Caucasian," a term derived from Johann Friedrich
Blumenbach's classification of races in The Natural Varieties of
Mankind.8 The second standard was what might be called the
"common knowledge" test. According to this rule, the term "white"
was to be understood as the word was used in common speech. The
standard enabled judges to resolve the facial ambiguity of the word
"white" through reference to popular linguistic usage. These two tests
coexisted without difficulty for some time, but over the course of the
early twentieth century, they began to yield conflicting and often
troubling results. With shifting patterns of global migration, new
groups of immigrants settled in the United States. Members of some
of these groups, such as Syrians and Asian Indians, were excluded
from naturalization based on the "common knowledge" test. They
could, however, make persuasive arguments that they were "white"
based on anthropological categories, particularly "Caucasian." The
"scientific standard" thus threatened to destabilize popular concep-
tions of national identity.
18. JOHANN FRIEDRICH BLUMENBACH, The Natural Varieties of Mankind, in THE
ANTHROPOLOGICAL TREATISES OF JOHANN FRIEDRICH BLUMENBACH 65 (Thomas Bendyshe
ed. & trans., London, Longman, Green, Roberts, & Green 1865) (1775). On the relation of
Blumenbach to 19th-century racial classification, see JOHN S. HALLER, JR., OUTCASTS FROM
EVOLUTION: SCIENTIFIC ATITUDES OF RACIAL INFERIORITY, 1859-1900 (1971).
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Ozawa and Thind stood at the center of this dilemma, and
according to Haney L6pez, they formed a dividing line in the debate
between the scientific and common knowledge standards in federal
law. Ozawa concerned the citizenship application of a resident of
Hawaii named Takao Ozawa, a man one scholar characterized as a
"paragon of an assimilated Japanese immigrant."1 9 Thind concerned
the application of Bhagat Singh Thind, an Asian Indian described in
the record as a "high caste Hindu," though he appears rather to have
identified with both the Sikh and Radhasoami traditions.2' After
judgments against Ozawa and in favor of Thind in the federal district
courts for Hawaii and Oregon respectively, the two cases reached the
Supreme Court. In each case, the ultimate issue was whether the
plaintiff could be considered "white." These were the only pre-
requisite cases ever considered by the Supreme Court, and not
surprisingly, they decided more than the specific questions of whether
Japanese or Asian Indians were capable of naturalizing (the Court
held that neither was). Instead, the cases determined the underlying
interpretive standard courts and immigration officials would use when
faced with similar cases in the future. It is at this point that Haney
L6pez makes a vital empirical claim, one that forms the historical
foundation for his book. He asserts that the Court in Ozawa, in an
opinion written by Justice Sutherland, was "eager to rely on
science, 2 1 embracing both the scientific and common knowledge
standards in its reasoning, but that some six months later, the Court
in Thind, in another opinion by Justice Sutherland, flatly rejected the
scientific standard, becoming "furiously apostate" in its position
toward anthropological classification.22 The Court in both cases
determined that the litigants in question were not white, but in Haney
L6pez's view, it did so for vastly different reasons, explicitly
foreclosing in Thind the interpretive openness expressed in Ozawa. In
doing so, the Court decided once and for all that only the common
knowledge test would determine what constituted a white person.
Haney L6pez bases his argument that Thind overturned Ozawa on
the Court's differing use of the term "Caucasian," and he draws
significant implications from that difference. Specifically, in arguing
that the Court in Ozawa actively blended both the scientific and
common knowledge standards in its decision, Haney L6pez points to
the Court's statement that it would read the words "white person" as
19. Yuji Ichioka, The Early Japanese Immigrant Quest for Citizenship: The Background of
the 1922 Ozawa Case, in JAPANESE IMMIGRANTS AND AMERICAN LAW: THE ALIEN LAND
LAWS AND OTHER ISSUES 397, 407 (Charles McClain ed., 1994).
20. United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 206 (1923).
21. HANEY L6PEZ, supra note 3, at 92.
22. Id. at 95.
19981
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indicating "a person of what is popularly known as the Caucasian
race."23 With this formulation, writes Haney L6pez, the Court "ran
together the rationales of common knowledge, evident in the
reference to what was 'popularly known,' and scientific evidence,
exemplified in the Court's reliance on the term 'Caucasian."' 24 For
signs of the doctrinal reversal in Thind, Haney L6pez points to the
Court's more forceful and limiting assertion that "the words 'free
white persons' are words of common speech, to be interpreted in
accordance with the understanding of the common man, synonymous
with the word 'Caucasian' only as that word is popularly
understood."25 With this declaration, writes Haney L6pez, "the use
of scientific evidence as an arbiter of race ceased."26 Haney L6pez
argues that the Court made this sudden reversal because its members
unconsciously were driven to maintain white supremacy through the
naturalization of racial difference.27  Whereas the weight of
anthropological evidence in Ozawa supported popular racial beliefs
that Japanese should be excluded from citizenship, a somewhat
plausible argument was made in Thind that Asian Indians were
"Caucasian" and thus "white."' Rather than "destabilize the notion
of a White race" by agreeing that Thind might indeed be entitled to
naturalize, the Court obscured the social contingency of racial
classification by rejecting the scientific standard and inscribing the
prejudice of "common knowledge" permanently into law.29 "The
Supreme Court in Ozawa manifested an abiding faith in science,"
argues Haney L6pez, "but only a few months later, in Thind, the
same Court, the same [J]ustices, even the same judicial author,
became furiously apostate. Underlying both their faith and their
apostasy was the deep conviction that race was natural."3
II
This is a powerful interpretation, one that enriches our understand-
ing of conceptions of U.S. citizenship. There is, however, an alter-
native way of reading Ozawa and Thind. In particular, while Haney
L6pez argues that Thind explicitly overruled Ozawa, one might as
plausibly suggest that Ozawa and Thind were not in opposition at all,
23. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 197 (1922).
24. HANEY LOPEZ, supra note 3, at 79.
25. Id. at 90 (citing Thind, 261 U.S. at 214-15).
26. Id. at 90.
27. See id. at 93. On the role of unconscious racism in the Court's decisionmaking, see id.
at 133-46.
28. For the argument that Asian Indians should be considered Caucasian on the basis of
anthropological authorities, see Thind, 261 U.S. at 205-06.
29. HANEY LOPEZ, supra note 3, at 93.
30. Id. at 95.
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but in fact advanced the same doctrinal position, with Thind merely
clarifying the argument against the scientific standard that the Court
already had made in its earlier decision. There are two bases for such
a reading. The first draws upon the language of the Ozawa opinion
itself. While the Court in Ozawa stated that the word "white" in
prerequisite cases should be understood as being synonymous with
"Caucasian," dictionaries of the period suggest that by 1922,
"Caucasian" did not have an especially scientific meaning, but instead
was used widely as an equivalent for European. One contemporary
etymological dictionary, for instance, describes the term as "formerly"
referring to Blumenbach's classification scheme, and other British and
American dictionaries of the period confirm this usage.3 This
reading of the Court's use of "Caucasian" comports with its own
reference to the term as it was "popularly known," and implies that
an argument that the Court was "eager to rely on science" in Ozawa
is overstated. Other passages in Ozawa suggest a similar
interpretation. At one point in its opinion, the Court paused to take
judicial notice of the anthropological evidence cited by counsel for
both parties. There, the Court appeared to suggest that such evidence
could play no role in its judgment, regardless of how skillful or
convincing it might be. "We have been furnished with elaborate briefs
in which the meaning of the words 'white person' is discussed with
ability and at length, both from the standpoint of judicial decision and
from that of the science of ethnology," Justice Sutherland wrote. "It
does not seem to us necessary, however, to follow counsel in their
extensive researches in these fields."32 Such a reading further accords
with at least one contemporary journalistic commentary about Ozawa,
which praises the Court's reasoning for precisely its nonscientific
character.33
The second basis supporting an alternative reading of Ozawa
concerns the man who wrote the opinion of the Court in both cases,
31. See, e.g., ERNEST WEEKLEY, AN ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH
266 (1921) ("[flormerly used (first by Blumenbach, c. 1800) for Indo-European, white races,
from supposed place of origin").
32. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 196-97 (1922).
33. See Law and Common Sense (collection of Library of Congress, George Sutherland
Papers, General Miscellany-Newspaper Clippings, 1906-1938, Box 7) (n.d.). The article read:
The decision by the United States Supreme Court that Japanese cannot become citizens
of the United States because they are not white is likely to amaze the average casual
reader of newspapers, not because of the quality of the decision but because a question so
obviously simple should never have gotten as far as the Supreme Court of the United
States. Every schoolboy knows that the Japanese is not Caucasian and he also knows that
the laws of his country restrict naturalization to "free white persons".... This decision...
may be considered a happy augury of the quality of the service [Justice Sutherland] will
perform. Those familiar with his career long have understood his belief that common sense
and law are neither irreconcilable nor incompatible ....
1998] 663
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Justice George Sutherland.34 While Justice Sutherland frequently is
the subject of derision among scholars today," most agree that he
was a man of unwavering principle-and two of his most central
beliefs suggest that it would have been out of character for him to be
"eager" to rely on anthropology in his decisionmaking. First, more
than any other member of the Court in 1922, Justice Sutherland
advanced the mantle of the "liberty of contract" jurisprudence
associated with Justice Stephen Field. Underlying Justice Sutherland's
adherence to this intellectual tradition was his absolute commitment
to natural law, which, for him, demanded great skepticism toward the
use of social science to resolve judicial questions.36 Justice Sutherland
believed that the function of the judiciary was to scrutinize legislation
according to the substantive due process limits imposed by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. In this interpretive universe,
anthropology had little relevance. Natural law limits were timeless,
universal, and ideal in character, unaffected by changing bodies of
knowledge created by professional thinkers. Justice Sutherland's work
in this respect reveals a consistent opposition to the use of scientific
evidence in appellate adjudication, and his views on this and other
matters can be understood as the precise opposite of those held by
Justice Louis Brandeis. Indeed, within a year of Ozawa (Justice
Sutherland's first opinion on the bench), he argued against the use of
the scientific evidence presented to the Court by Brandeis prot6g6
Felix Frankfurter in Adkins v. Children's Hospital.7 There, Justice
Sutherland suggested that such evidence could not bind the judiciary.
Rather than characterizing Justice Sutherland's opinions in Ozawa
and Thind as indicating a shift from the use of an anthropological
taxonomy to the deployment of a common knowledge standard in
naturalization cases, then, it is possible to read both opinions as
revealing their author's continuing wariness regarding the use of social
science by the Court.
34. While Haney L6pez acknowledges that both opinions were written by Justice Sutherland,
he chooses not to explore this biographical aspect of the cases, remarking simply that the great
doctrinal differences between Ozawa and Thind are "all the more remarkable" for the fact of
their having been written by the same author. HANEY LOPEZ, supra note 3, at 92. On Justice
Sutherland, see HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: RESTORING A
JURISPRUDENCE OF NATURAL RIGHTS (1994); and JOEL FRANCIS PASCHAL, MR. JUSTICE
SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE STATE (1951).
35. See, e.g., Justice George Sutherland and the Status Quo: A Biographical and Review
Essay, 1995 J. Sup. Cr. HIST. 137; Gary C. Leedes, An Unsuccessful Attempt to Restore Justice
George Sutherland's Tarnished Reputation: A Review Essay, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 815 (1996).
36. See ARKES, supra note 34, at 51-82; PASCHAL, supra note 34, at 121-24.
37. See Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 559-60 (1923) ("A mass of reports,
opinions of special observers and students of the subject, and the like, has been brought before
us in support of [the minimum wage law at issue]. These are all proper enough for the con-
sideration of the lawmaking bodies ... but they reflect no legitimate light upon the question of
[the legislation's] validity.").
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This argument is reinforced by yet another facet of Justice Suther-
land's jurisprudential life: his drive to consolidate federal authority
over international matters. This drive would have militated against
yielding congressional control over lawmaking to anthropologists.
Sutherland firmly believed in the inviolable integrity of the Union,
and he sought to further national coherence by granting the federal
government extensive power over international matters. The Justice
saw himself as a forward-thinking person in this respect, and he
fervently hoped to develop a body of constitutional law that would
allow the government to respond to contemporary needs (the United
States, he insisted, "is a progressive nation in a progressive world").38
So firmly did Sutherland believe in the importance of expanding
federal authority over international affairs that he argued that the
federal government had been granted a vast foreign policy command
merely as an incident of national sovereignty. He advanced this
position not only theoretically, in his early writings, but also practical-
ly, in his opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.39
Given his intense, overarching interest in strengthening federal
authority over international matters, one can well imagine that
Sutherland would have felt his general aversion to using social science
with particular force in the prerequisite cases. Although popularly
understood as a domestic concern, naturalization law bears directly on
the United States's relations with other powers. Considering Suther-
land's views on federal authority and world affairs, it would have been
the height of folly, in his eyes, to suggest that legal language
concerning naturalization crafted by the U.S. Congress might be
limited by anthropologists. This would have implied that the scope of
U.S. international policy could be restricted by the writings of a few
isolated scholars. For a "progressive nation in a progressive world,"
such a restrictive conclusion would have been untenable.
III
The possibility that Ozawa and Thind are not in doctrinal op-
position, but instead are of a piece, is significant not simply as a
factual matter, but also as a theoretical issue of broader importance.
In particular, viewing the Court as having rejected a scientific
standard in both cases suggests the complex way in which the history
of American citizenship has been guided by social and political forces
other than simple racism, even of the unconscious variety Haney
L6pez describes. If Justice Sutherland in fact rejected a scientific
38. GEORGE SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS 48 (1919).
39. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 209 U.S. 304 (1936).
1998]
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standard in Ozawa, he seems to have been driven not so much by an
interest in maintaining white supremacy as by judicial principles
arising from his belief in natural law and his desire to safeguard the
foreign affairs capacity of the federal government. He seems to have
been guided, that is, by largely nonracial motives. Indeed, Justice
Sutherland explicitly denied in Ozawa that the Court was guided by
racism,' and as a matter of historical method, it is worthwhile to
consider such denials as being not wholly disingenuous. To the extent
such denials are sincere, they suggest that racially restrictive judicial
decisions are inextricable from legal ideas having no immediately
apparent connection to racial issues. Conversely, seemingly nonracial
legal ideas are deeply implicated in matters of race. Being attentive
to this dialogical relation suggests the need to supplement the
normative lesson Haney L6pez draws from the prerequisite cases: that
whites should develop a "self-deconstructive White race-conscious-
ness ' 4t  to "dismantle the meaning systems surrounding
Whiteness"42 and so "relinquish the privileges" of white identity.43
Such self-reflexive knowledge may destroy Flagg's "transparency
phenomenon" by undercutting the naturalization of racial difference.
But when the differences between Ozawa and Thind are collapsed,
and the Court's motivations are shown to rest on nonracial as much
as racial grounds, legal and cultural interventions at the level of race
alone seem an inadequate way of combating racial exclusion. A
reinterpretation of the prerequisite cases may bring into greater relief
the intractability of the racism that Haney L6pez explores in his
fascinating and important book.
-Mark S. Weiner
40. He wrote:
The briefs filed on behalf of appellant refer in complimentary terms to the culture and en-
lightenment of the Japanese people, and with this estimate we have no reason to disagree;
but these are matters which cannot enter into our consideration of the questions here at
issue.... Of course there is not implied-either in the legislation or in our interpretation
of it-any suggestion of unworthiness or racial inferiority. These considerations are in no
manner involved.
Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922)
41. HANEY LOPEZ, supra note 3, at 31.
42. Id. at 183.
43. Id. at 202.
10
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